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For years, a particular way of thinking about the relationship between 
religious strife, law, and legal processes has influenced conversations among scholars, 
human rights activists and policy makers. This way of thinking sees law as an antidote 
to religious tensions. “Rule of law,” the logic goes, acts as a force of moderation and, 
in matters of religion, serves as a key tool for mollifying or resolving disputes.  
One does not have to go far to find examples of this paradigm. In a December 
2013 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, celebrated the power of law to help 
resolve chronic patterns of religious violence and hatred. He insisted that  
[a]n open constitutional framework that allows free manifestations of existing 
or emerging religious pluralism on the basis of equal respect for all is a sine 
qua non of any policy directed towards eliminating collective religious hatred 
by building trust through public institutions. (United Nations General 
Assembly 2013: 11) 
 
According to Bielefeldt, institutions of law—above all constitutions and the courts 
that interpret them—serve as bulwarks against religious strife, polarization and 
hatred. Constitutional law, he insists, is central to resolving conflicts among religious 
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groups.1 Bielefeldt’s perspective finds considerable support in academic writing on 
constitutional law and human rights. One influential example of this can be seen in 
Ran Hirschl’s (2010) important book, Constitutional Theocracy, in which he writes 
that constitutional courts work to contain, constrain and streamline religious interests 
and impulses in public life such that “constitutional law and courts in virtually all 
such polities have become bastions of relative secularism, pragmatism, and 
moderation” (p. 13). A similar argument has been made in the arena of ethnic conflict 
where incorporating incentives that encourage moderation, cooperation and 
accommodation in legal and institutional arrangements (including constitutional 
design and amendments, the political system and electoral processes), is expected to 
contain, limit, channel or manage conflict (Horowitz, 1985/2000, 2002 2008; Lijphart, 
2004; Reilly, 2001).  
 Although intuitively attractive, these understandings of law as a salve for 
religious strife belie the escalation of religious tensions that often accompanies the 
judicialization of religious disputes in much of South and Southeast Asia. A closer 
look at recent history in Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan suggests that 
religion-related court cases—particularly those involving the legal defense of 
religious rights and religious freedoms—have not always generated the mollifying 
effects that scholars might predict. Rather than serving as mechanisms to soften 
religious boundaries and harmonize religious interests, legal processes and institutions 
have, in certain cases, produced a hardening of boundaries and a sharpening of 
antagonisms among religious communities. Law itself has participated in the 
intensifying of religious conflict. 
 This study examines how and why this intensification comes about. In what 
follows, we analyze several discrete instances—from Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia, and 
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Pakistan—in which law and courts have played key roles in encouraging processes of 
religious polarization. Our goal is not to argue that law and legal action always 
exacerbate religious conflict, but rather to look closely at the unintended 
consequences of legalizing religious conflicts and to call attention to certain ways in 
which legal action might deepen and sharpen the very conflicts over religion it 
purports to resolve. In particular, we wish to highlight four specific mechanisms 
through which legal procedures, structures and instruments can further polarize 
already existing religious conflicts. The mechanisms include the procedural 
requirements and choreography of litigation itself (Sri Lanka), the strategic use of 
legal language and court judgments by political and socioreligious groups (India), the 
activities of partisan activists who mobilize around litigation (Malaysia), and the 
exploitation of “public order” laws in contexts framed by antagonism targeting 
religious minorities (Pakistan). In each of the four cases examined here, law and legal 
institutions can be thought to intensify preexisting religious tensions.  
While the countries under study share much in common—a British colonial 
inheritance, common law systems, personal law regimes, ethnically and religiously 
diverse populations, to mention just a few features—the goal of this comparison is not 
to present Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan as jurisdictions of a specific 
(problematic) type.2 Rather we bring these varied case studies together in order to 
persuade the reader that polarization via law and legal institutions is not anomalous 
nor specific to any one type of context. By juxtaposing four distinct examples—each 
of which falls within a particular author’s area of expertise—we see ourselves as 
taking an initial step toward broader comparative reflection on these matters. While 
we believe that the mechanisms of legal polarization that we examine extend to many 
other countries, our goal is not to have the final word, but to encourage further 
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research and clear the way for new theoretical work that can help scholars and 
policymakers think about the counterproductive dynamics that may accompany the 
judicialization of disputes related to religion. 
 
1. Sri Lanka: Polarizing Procedures  
To say that law generates conflict might appear obvious, even mildly 
tautological. Among other things, law serves as a formalized system for framing 
disputes in public settings; a defining function of litigation involves the ordered 
presentation of competing claims. However, in ordering these claims and presenting 
them for adjudication, legal processes do not simply take social disputes as they are, 
in all their complexity. Rather, legal institutions produce for the court certain types of 
disputes that can be resolved by the court: disputes between two parties, over specific 
and well-circumscribed matters of law (e.g. over particular rights or duties; Shapiro, 
1986). In certain cases this process of translating conflict from social-political 
domains into the legal domain unwittingly serves to further sharpen the interests that 
gave rise to conflict in the first place by requiring moderate stakeholders to align with 
one litigating party or another. In the case of multifaceted religious conflicts in which 
a range of perspectives and alignments exist, litigation may lead to the erosion of 
middle ground and encourage the polarization of the conflict into opposite and 
opposing groups. 
These polarizing effects of litigation can be seen clearly in the context of 
popular and legal contests over religious conversion—particularly conversions to 
Christianity—in Sri Lanka.3 From the late 1990s until 2004, one saw in civil society 
and the media a vigorous debate over the proselytizing activities of evangelical 
Christian organizations. Many of these organizations had come to the island in recent 
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decades and set up churches in rural and urban areas that were badly affected by 
poverty and civil war. By the late 1990s, some Sri Lankans became increasingly 
concerned that these groups were using “unethical” techniques to convert Buddhists, 
Hindus, and Catholics to evangelical Christianity. The alleged techniques included 
giving cash or other gifts to new converts, helping them with securing visas to live 
overseas, employing them within church NGOs, and extending other types of 
inducements to convert (Berkwitz 2008; Mahadev 2014). 
In the early 2000s, a variety of religious organizations issued public 
statements indicating their concern about the possibility of “unethical” conversions. 
The Catholic Bishops Congress put out press releases expressing their concern over 
the “the social unrest alleged to be caused by certain activities of the fundamentalist 
Christian sects” (Daily News, 2003). Hindu groups, including the All-Ceylon Hindu 
Congress and others, condemned what they saw as the cynical conversion of war-
affected Tamils by Christian groups posing as relief organizations. The Hindu author 
of one Tamil-language editorial from 2000 (celebrated and reprinted in the Hindu 
Organ) even called on Hindus to recognize the threat posed by new, foreign, 
extremist Christian groups, supported by foreign powers who “exploit the situation of 
poverty and war” to undertake a project similar to colonial-era Christians: inculcate 
Christianity and destroy local cultural values (intucātanam 2000, p. 26). Most 
prominently, a variety of Buddhist organizations rallied together to raise awareness 
about and combat the alleged unethical conversions among poorer urban and village 
populations.  
At the same time, there were also religious groups who were working together 
to think of ways to allay concerns and propose solutions. In Colombo, several 
Christian groups met to consider developing a common protocol of “ethical” 
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evangelizing for Sri Lanka. Similarly, representatives from popular Buddhist and 
Hindu organizations met to discuss the legal limits that could be applied to “forcible” 
conversions. In fact in early 2004, this Hindu-Buddhist group even completed a draft 
bill, which they submitted to the president for consideration in January.4  
One could summarize the terrain of disputes over religious conversion in 
January 2004 as one in which a wide variety of religious groups were actively 
collaborating in deciding how to address allegations about unethical conversions in 
different ways. Some Hindu and Buddhist groups worked together in pursuing legal 
measures, while Catholics and certain mainline Protestants—who were empathetic to 
the concerns of Buddhists and Hindus—were in the process of developing their own 
“in-house” manuals and protocols of “ethical” conversion.5  
To look at the situation 6 months later, however, one sees a pattern of radical 
polarization. From a situation in which a variety of religious communities were 
involved in interreligious and intrareligious dialogue over how best to deal with the 
problem of religious conversion, the issue of conversion suddenly split conservative 
Buddhists from all other religious communities. A major catalyst for this polarization 
was a large court case involving the preenactment constitutional review of a bill 
designed to criminalize certain types of proselytizing activities. 
Between January and July 2004, during the time that Christian groups were 
deliberating and while the Hindu-Buddhist draft bill was being considered by the 
president, another draft legislation purporting to combat “forcible conversion” found 
its way to the floor of parliament. Called the “Prohibition of Forcible Conversion 
Bill,” this draft law appeared on parliament’s Order Paper in May 2004 as a Private 
Members’ Bill introduced by the newly elected Buddhist nationalist party known as 
the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). Unlike the bill produced by the Hindu-Buddhist 
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committee described above, the JHU’s bill was not the product of extensive 
discussions. Instead it was an almost-verbatim copy of a conversion bill that had been 
introduced (and repealed) in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Like the Tamil Nadu bill, 
it rendered as a criminal offense any attempt to convert a person from on religion to 
another by means of physical force, financial “allurement” or “fraud.”  
The introduction of the bill had the effect of pushing previously multifaceted 
discussions over conversion onto a path of constitutional litigation. Predictably, a 
variety of evangelical Christian groups opposed the bill and, turning to a form of legal 
action, invoked constitutional procedures of preenactment judicial review, requesting 
the Supreme Court to rule that the bill violated fundamental rights to freedom of 
religion.6 Equally predictably, the more nationalistically inclined Buddhist groups, led 
by the JHU, rallied behind the bill and intervened against the judicial-review 
petitions.  
What is notable is that the Catholic Bishops, Hindu groups, and more centrist 
Buddhists—all of whom had previously voiced sympathetic concern for popular 
anxieties about “unethical” conversions—were now in a bind. With the arrival of a 
litigious framework, they found themselves pulled towards the inflexible position of 
taking one side (that of the nationalist Buddhist JHU and its bill) or the other side 
(that of opponents calling for preenactment judicial review to prevent legal limitations 
on conversion) in response to an issue that, for them, was much more complex. Those 
who opposed legal limits on conversion, even if they were deeply concerned about 
conversion practices, felt compelled to oppose such a harsh and inflexible law. At the 
same time, those who favored a legal solution felt that, even if they did not approve of 
the terms of this particular bill, they should at least intervene on its behalf to ensure 
that the court would not rule unconstitutional the very idea of a legal limitation on 
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religious conversion. The result was that the same Hindu and Christian individuals 
and groups that had been involved with designing other creative types of solutions to 
the “conversion problem” petitioned against the bill, while conservative Buddhist 
groups that had previously worked alongside Hindu organizations to draft their own 
bill joined the JHU in their legal defense.  
In interviews conducted in 2008 and 2009, representatives from all sides 
indicated how unsatisfactory and frustrating this shakedown was. One Buddhist 
member of the Buddhist-Hindu working committee characterized the experience of 
committee members as follows:  
[S]ome people felt, what is the point in this [JHU Conversion] bill, it is bloody 
useless we will not have this bill. But most of the people felt, ‘well half a loaf is 
better then none, let us at least have this….’7 
 
Similar appraisals were made by members of Christian and Hindu groups that were 
interviewed, many of whom referred to the fact that, with the turn towards 
litigiousness, all other attempts at dealing with the issue of unethical conversion 
(either through interreligious committees, or civil society projects or intra-Christian 
reform initiatives) abruptly halted. 
This is not to say that there were no attempts to communicate the complexity 
of the issues at play; some petitioners did. Yet these suggestions of complexity were 
ultimately drowned out or obscured in the gross logic of a more powerful 
litigiousness, which presented the debate—to both the court and, significantly, to the 
public-at-large who followed these proceedings with interest in newspapers and on 
TV—as an agonistic battle between two parties: opponents and supporters of the bill, 
or, even more starkly, as opponents or supporters of formal, state-based, legal limits 
on “unethical” conversion. That is, the logic, choreography and procedural 
requirements of constitutional review—which remained “hard wired”8 to present the 
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debate as a contest between two opposing parties, petitioners and intervening 
petitioners—worked to dilute and cover over the many innovative solutions that had 
been proposed previously by groups and alliances representing a variety of religious 
organizations and denominations.  
 The above anecdote serves as a powerful illustration of the ways in which the 
choreography and requirements of litigation may polarize religious interests and 
undermine the possibility for middle-ground compromises. This is especially true in 
cases where (as in the 2004 conversion bill) there are a variety of interested parties 
and stakeholders, and where legal action is initiated by groups on one end of the 
ideological spectrum and opposed by those on the other. In the Sri Lankan case, 
constitutional frameworks and the protocols and procedures they imposed on 
articulating and managing conflict worked to transform what were previously 
multireligious and interreligious groups into a stark Buddhist versus others binary. In 
addition, the many possibilities for realignment and border crossing that presented 
themselves prior to the JHU bill case seemed to disappear. Once processed through 
the authorized mechanics of constitutional litigation, Sri Lankans found it difficult to 
reclaim or recover the terms and creativity of a more fluid prelitigation state.  
 
2. India: Polarizing Judgments 
 Like Sri Lanka, India has also been a site for conflict and controversy over 
religious conversion. Here, too, constitutional law and judgments on religious 
conversions have polarized religious groups.  In particular, they have provided 
opportunities for socioreligious groups, particularly the Hindu Right, to polarize 
public discourse and deepen discord among India’s religious communities.9  
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To see how this works, one must go back to 1978, when a Christian 
missionary named Reverend Stainislaus challenged the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of 
Religion Act (passed in 1968) in the Madhya Pradesh High Court.  The Act prohibited 
conversion by force, fraud, or inducement (a very similar formula to the Sri Lankan 
bill described above) and prescribed 1 year’s imprisonment and a fine for those 
convicted.  Stanislaus objected to the Act on the grounds that the definition of 
inducement was overly broad.  Losing the case in the High Court, Stainislaus 
appealed to the Supreme Court, where the case was heard with another case from 
Orissa, relating to a similar law regarding conversion.10   In its verdict, the Supreme 
Court of India upheld both acts.  The Chief Justice, writing for the court, insisted that 
there was “no fundamental right to convert another person to one’s own religion” 
because such a right “would impinge on the freedom of conscience guaranteed to all 
citizens of the country alike” (Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 2 SCR 
611).  
Interpreted as a victory for Hindus (vis-à-vis Christian missionaries), this 
verdict emboldened the Hindu Right in India, prompting Hindu nationalists to 
introduce a new federal “Freedom of Religion Bill” in the Indian Parliament in 
December 1978. The Bill (modeled on the 1968 Act in Madhya Pradesh) sought to 
prohibit conversion from one religion to another by the use of force or inducement or 
by fraudulent means, and cited the Stainislaus judgment as legitimizing the Bill.11  
This Bill was backed by the Prime Minister (Morarji Desai) of the ruling coalition, 
who portrayed it as a way to give tribal groups the “protection of the state” from 
conversion by missionaries. Although the Bill did not pass (because the Prime 
Minister subsequently withdrew his support after agitation by Christian groups), this 
high profile legislative attempt stimulated the introduction of several state-level 
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anticonversion bills in the state legislatures of Gujarat, Chattisgarh, and Himachal 
Pradesh.12 The court’s disinclination to strike down such bills influenced the Tamil 
Nadu government to enact an anticonversion Ordinance in 2005 (mentioned in the 
case of Sri Lanka, above), which it subsequently withdrew for political reasons. 
Challenges to the other bills are currently pending in India’s courts.  
The Stainislaus verdict and its aftermath pose two questions for scholars: (a) Is 
the Supreme Court of India biased towards Hindus and against the proselytizing 
religions of Islam and Christianity and (b) even if it is, what explains the way that the 
judgment was politicized by the Hindu Right?13  
In surveying conversion-related cases in India’s higher judiciary, one can 
clearly observe a trend towards limiting conversion activities. The higher judiciary in 
India has favoured an anticonversion stance, not because judges are biased, but 
because of decisions made in the constitution to limit the access to social justice to, 
among others, the bottom-most groups within Hinduism.14 Caste, a hierarchical 
system that impacts significantly Hindus’ social status, occupational and economic 
roles, is central to Hinduism, which accounts for approximately 80.5% (2001 Census) 
of India’s population. In addition, 13.4% are Muslims, and 2% are Christians (2001 
Census). Most disadvantaged in the caste system are the dalits, whom Indian legal 
discourse refers to as “scheduled castes” (SCs, approximately 16.6% of India’s 
population according to the 2011 Census).  Dalits are often derogatorily referred to as 
“untouchables” and have traditionally suffered discrimination and violence at the 
hands of the upper castes, and continue to do so even today particularly in rural India. 
Most conversions in independent India occur among dalits/SCs and “scheduled 
tribes” (indigenous peoples who too have suffered such discrimination) who want to 
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improve their low social standing by converting to Islam and Christianity, which 
promise “equality” to their congregants.  
The framers of the Indian Constitution had a foundational commitment to 
social justice for these discriminated groups, and allowed only SCs and scheduled 
tribes to qualify for affirmative action benefits.  These benefits include quotas 
reserved in government jobs, political constituencies, and educational institutions. 
However, the initial legal definition of an SC as a Hindu or a Sikh, limited the range 
of beneficiaries to the disadvantaged groups within Hinduism. This decision has 
meant that the constitution (and India’s lower laws that conform to it) inadvertently 
installed barriers to conversion from Hinduism.  It is this constitutional linking of 
entrenched social disadvantage with Hinduism that explains the apparent 
anticonversion bias of the courts.  By curtailing the ability of an SC convert to access 
affirmative action benefits, courts have discouraged conversions from Hinduism, but  
also indirectly encouraged reconversions to Hinduism, thereby creating discord  with 
the proselytizing religions (namely, Christianity and Islam), and deepening, rather 
than modulating, religious polarization.  
 An analysis of 80 religious conversion cases in the High Courts and the 
Supreme Court reveals a jurisprudential tilt towards facilitating conversion to 
Hinduism and obstructing conversion away from Hinduism. Of the 80 cases, 42% 
dealt with affirmative action benefits, 38% with personal law disputes, and 15% 
pertained to propagation.15 Reconversions to Hinduism (36%) and conversions to 
Islam (23%) and Christianity (28%) were among the main issues tackled by the courts 
in these cases. In over half of the cases dealing with affirmative action, SC converts to 
Islam and Christianity were stripped of their welfare benefits, though several 
judgments recognized that even after conversion caste sticks to the convert. But on 
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reconversion to Hinduism, the Court, on grounds that affirmative action was a group 
right, allowed the SC person to regain the welfare privileges as long as he or she 
could prove that the caste had accepted him into its fold (S. Anbalangan v. B. 
Devarajan, 1984 AIR 411). Scheduled tribe converts on the other hand, were more 
likely to receive a favourable ruling. They were allowed to retain their benefits on 
grounds that “a member of a Tribe despite his change in the religion may remain a 
member of the Tribe if he continues to follow the tribal traits and customs” (State of 
Kerala and Anr v. Chandramohanan [2004) 3 SCC 429).  
In reviewing these cases, one can see that the Indian constitution and its 
interpreters, the judiciary, in their pursuit of one legal goal (social justice) have 
encouraged a particular interpretation of religious freedom which, in its application to 
affirmative action, favors Hinduism over and against Christianity and Islam.16 The 
bias of the law towards Hindu SCs curtailed the freedom of proselytizing religions to 
convert, created interreligious discord, buoyed Hindu majoritarianism, and angered 
influential members of minority religions.    
Let us focus on the use of legal judgments by Hindu nationalists, who have 
long opposed proselytizing. Their guiding ideology, known as Hindutva, or 
Hinduness, was defined by V.D. Sarvarkar in the 1920s as “embracing all the 
departments of thought and activity of the whole Being of our Hindu race.” For 
Savarkar, who was an atheist, Hindus were a “race” who by definition followed a 
particular religion.  Relatedly, Hindutva was a means for promoting the superiority of 
the Hindu race. Sarvarkar’s ideological heir, M.S. Golwalkar, felt that the exodus of 
Hindus to other religions would be “dangerous to the security of the nation and the 
country.”17  Given the inability of the caste structure to deliver equality and dignity to 
the SCs (12% of the population) within Hinduism, and the fact that the court has 
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allowed scheduled tribes (who are not within the caste structure) to retain the benefits 
of affirmative action after conversion, it is not surprising that the Hindu Right has 
backed anticonversion bills as being the most effective route to stopping the exodus.  
 In the wake of the Stainislaus’ decision, India’s courts have given Hindu 
nationalists new ways to express and legitimize their long-standing opposition to 
conversion. Part of the blame also lies with the ambiguity in the Indian Constitution, 
in particular, its difficulty in classifying Hinduism, which Constituent framers 
variously viewed as a religion, culture, and a way of life.18 This perhaps-unavoidable 
ambiguity has contributed to judgments that have blurred the line between religion, 
ideology, culture, and politics. This was most notably highlighted in a set of 
judgments on the Bharatiya Janata Party’s use of “Hindutva” in election speeches, and 
provided the proponents of the Hindu Right with “a judicial imprimatur” to use 
Hindutva in the public and political arenas.19   
It is unsurprising, then, that the ideologues of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS) and other organizations of the Hindu Right had a positive image of the 
court’s judgments on proselytization. In their view, the court tried to “minimize the 
harmful impact of the constitution” and “balanced” the needs of (the predominantly 
Hindu) society by handing down judgments against conversion and “upholding 
Hinduism or Hindutva as part of the national character rather than confining it to a 
religion on par with Islam and Christianity”.20  It is also unsurprising that, in 
December 2014, RSS members led a mass conversion drive in which  350 Muslims in 
Agra were “returned home” to Hinduism.  This sparked an explosive debate in 
Parliament and a walkout by the opposition, who called on the government to protect 
the constitutional rights of religious minorities. What this episode shows is an 
escalation of “Hindu proselytization” aimed at creating insecurity for the 
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proselytizing religions, forcing Christian and Muslim groups to demand the state’s 
intervention and ironically perhaps even an anti-conversion law.  The strategy of the 
Hindu Right is clear from their comment that the Modi government was “free to bring 
a law to ban conversions by inducement and fraud, including Agra conversions” 
(Gurumurthy, 2014).  
The complex story of conversion laws in India shows how the language of 
religious freedom and the authority of the courts can work to add further fuel to 
religious nationalism and give further legitimation to patterns of minority exclusion. 
In these cases, the formally neutral rubrics of religious freedom and religious rights 
have covered over very real social justice issues within the Hindu community itself: 
concerns over out-conversion from Hinduism have provided a convenient cover for 
ignoring the continuing harmful effects of caste.  If Indian law has been revolutionary 
in its ambitions for religious harmony, freedom, and reform, it has been equally 
culpable in the stalling and inhibiting of each. Courts, by hardening boundaries and 
sharpening antagonisms among religious communities, will have to share the guilt.  
  
3. Malaysia: Polarizing Activists 
Courts also stand at the center of heated debates concerning religious freedom 
in Malaysia. Conventional accounts trace these tensions to the rise of the dakwah 
(religious revival) movement, which has been the most dynamic social and political 
trend since the late 1970s. According to this understanding, legal controversies around 
religious freedom are the result of a standoff originating outside the courts, between 
an ascendant religious movement and a liberal constitutional order. Framed this way, 
the question that naturally follows is whether the courts have the ability and resolve to 
uphold religious liberty, or if they will succumb to popular political pressure.21 This 
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understanding of the root problem (religious revival), what is at stake (liberty), and 
the institutional mechanisms to defend those values (law and courts) comes 
effortlessly because it matches our taken–for–granted understanding of the role of the 
law and courts in defending fundamental liberties and sustaining secularism.  
But this functional understanding of judicial process precludes deeper insight 
into how and why religious liberty cases continually crop up in the Malaysian courts. 
A first clue that we need to search for deeper meaning in the Malaysian context is the 
fact that appeals to religious liberty are invoked by a variety of actors, each working 
at cross-purposes. Claims to religious liberty are made by religious minority groups 
(Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Taoist, and heterodox Muslims) vis-à-vis the 
Muslim majority. But spokespersons for the Muslim majority also deploy “rights 
talk” vis-à-vis religious minority groups. And claims to religious freedom are not only 
voiced across communal lines; they are also heard within religious communities, as 
individuals assert the right to religious liberty for their own persons, whereas 
spokespersons of religious communities invoke religious liberty in their claim to 
defend collective norms from state interference.  
These dynamics were at work in the most well-known Malaysian court case, 
Lina Joy v. Religious Council of the Federal Territories, which lasted nearly a decade 
and became a public spectacle at home and abroad.22 The case concerned a woman 
who sought state recognition of her religious conversion from Islam to Christianity. In 
litigating Joy’s right to religious freedom, her attorneys challenged the personal status 
laws in force in the Federal Territories, which provided no viable avenue for the state 
to recognize conversion out of Islam. Joy’s attorneys argued that the laws violated her 
right to religious freedom, a right enshrined in Article 11 of the Malaysian 
Constitution, which states (in part) that “Every person has the right to profess and 
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practice his religion….” But Joy’s opponents invoked another clause from the same 
article, which states that “Every religious group has the right…to manage its own 
religious affairs….” This second set of attorneys also claimed the right to religious 
freedom, but they argued that Article 11 was meant to safeguard the ability of 
religious communities to craft their own rules and regulations (including rules of 
entry and exit) free from outside interference. It is striking that protagonists on both 
sides of the controversy invoked religious freedom, and that both sides called upon 
the state to secure these alternate visions.  
While the legal battle raged on for over a decade in the Malaysian courts of 
law, an equally significant battle emerged in the court of public opinion. Competing 
groups of politicians, media outlets, and civil society groups shaped public discourse 
along two competing frames. Liberal rights groups formed a coalition named “Article 
11” after the article of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion. The 
coalition included prominent human rights organizations, including the All Women’s 
Action Society, the Bar Council of Malaysia, the National Human Rights Society 
(HAKAM), the Malaysian Civil Liberties Society, Sisters in Islam, Suara Rakyat 
Malaysia (SUARAM), and the Women’s Aid Organization. The Article 11 Coalition 
also included the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, 
Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST), an umbrella organization 
representing the concerns of non-Muslim communities in Malaysia. The objective of 
the Article 11 coalition was to focus public attention on the erosion of individual 
rights and to “ensure that Malaysia does not become a theocratic state.”23 The 
coalition produced a website, short documentary videos, and recorded roundtables on 
the threat posed by Islamic law. They went on to organize a series of public forums 
across Malaysia.  
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Parallel to this mobilization, a broad array of over 50 conservative Muslim 
NGOs united in a second coalition calling itself Muslim Organizations for the 
Defense of Islam (Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam), or Defenders 
(PEMBELA) for short. PEMBELA’s founding statement explained that the 
immediate motivation for organizing was the ongoing court cases which, in their 
view, challenged “the position of Islam in the Constitution and the legal system of this 
country.”24 PEMBELA organized dozens of public forums and flooded the Malay 
language press with hundreds of articles and opinion pieces on the need to defend the 
autonomy of the shariah courts from outside interference.25 
Lina Joy’s case remained unknown to the Malaysian public until it was 
brought into the media spotlight by these liberal and conservative activists beginning 
in 2002.26 Taken from the court of law and deployed in the court of public opinion, 
these legal controversies assumed a different character. Political entrepreneurs, 
particularly those on the conservative side of the divide, did not stress the technical 
details of the Lina Joy case and other similar cases. Quite the opposite, they mobilized 
around the cases to advance more expansive rights claims and narratives of injury. 
Complex legal dilemmas were transformed into compelling narratives of injustice and 
redeployed in the public sphere. The cases gave new energy and focus to variously-
situated civil society groups, catalyzed the formation of entirely new NGOs, and 
provided a focal point for political mobilization outside of the courts.  
Two factors facilitated the efforts of activists to translate court rulings into 
compelling narratives of injustice. First, court rulings and the logics that supported 
them were not fully legible to those without legal training. Judicial decisions are 
“technical accounts” as opposed to “stories” (Tilly 2006) and, as such, they are not 
easily accessible to a lay audience. The technical nature of court rulings affords an 
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opportunity for political entrepreneurs to recast specialized and specific matters along 
broader stylized and emotive frames, presenting polarized narratives of injustice for 
public consumption. A second factor that enabled political actors to effectively 
convey strikingly different messages was media segmentation along ethnolinguistic 
lines. Although English is the common language for most educated and urbanized 
Malaysians, the vernacular press is divided between Chinese, Tamil, and Malay 
language media, each of which carried strikingly divergent coverage of the cases that 
mapped on to the polarizing narratives advanced by liberal and Islamist NGOs. 
The political spectacle accompanying these cases exacerbated the dilemmas 
that attorneys, judges, and everyday citizens encountered in their efforts to maneuver 
through the Malaysian legal system. In the past, attorneys had found pragmatic ways 
of helping Malaysians change their official legal status, in spite of lacunas in the law. 
Malaysians had been able to secure state recognition of conversion by affirming a 
statutory declaration before a commissioner of oaths and registering a new name in 
the civil court registry through a deed poll.27 With these two documents, an individual 
could then secure a new identity card reflecting the name change, which signified 
one’s new, non-Muslim status. For most purposes, including marriage, one could then 
go on with life as one wished (Ahmad 2005). In other words, workable solutions were 
available for individuals and couples attempting to negotiate their way between the 
two personal status regimes.28 
But once Lina Joy and other cases became the object of intense public debate, 
intense pressures engulfed both the shariah and the civil courts. This politicized 
environment made it difficult even for sympathetic shariah court judges to facilitate 
state recognition of conversion out of Islam. Likewise, intense political pressure made 
it difficult for civil court judges to intervene when fundamental liberties were in 
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jeopardy. Ironically, the tools and institutions that we instinctively turn to for 
justice—law and courts—had become a principal source of political tension in 
Malaysia. Instead of resolving legal questions, the court system produced legal 
controversies anew. Rather than simply arbitrating between contending parties, court 
rulings exacerbated ideological cleavages. And, instead of assuaging uncertainties, 
courts repeatedly instilled a tremendous degree of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and 
anxiety around the meaning and content of “religious freedom.”  
 
4. Pakistan: Polarizing Protests 
When Pakistan was created in 1947, constructions of the Muslim ‘nation’ 
incorporated both Sunni Muslims as well as Shi’a and Ahmadi figures like 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah (the Father of the Nation) and Foreign Minister Zafarullah 
Khan. Religious minorities often crossed over into a broadly secular mainstream; 
sectarian boundaries were blurred to make space for new political alliances; and 
doctrinal boundaries were enlarged to facilitate the process of nation-building.29  
Over time, however, this framework changed as minority groups like the 
Ahmadis came to be excluded. This exclusion was often legitimized by means of 
broad legal rubrics that remain absolutely central to most liberal constitutional 
regimes—above all, the view that religious freedom is protected “subject to public 
order.” It was, in many ways, via the manipulation of these legal rubrics that 
heterodox groups like the Ahmadis came to be excluded. At the level of religious self-
identification, the Ahmadis did not actively convert away from Islam; their self-
identification as Muslims was simply reinterpreted as an insult to other Muslims and, 
as such, a religious “provocation” threatening public order. This reference to the legal 
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notion of public order was, in turn, used to justify the derogation of their fundamental 
rights. 
Pakistan’s early constitutional drafters sought to balance a concern for legally 
defensible fundamental rights (including religious freedom) with a preambular nod to 
the sovereignty of God (“delegated to the state through its people”).30 This 
constitution-writing process was notable insofar as it involved lay Muslims seeking to 
marginalise the influence of Muslim clerics who claimed an exclusive power to 
ascertain the will of God (and, thus, to interpret the meaning of God's sovereignty). In 
effect, Pakistan’s lay leaders sought to manage the influence of clerical views in order 
to protect more inclusive ideas about the religious parameters of the nation.  
Even as the constitution-drafting process was still underway, however, clerics 
and conservative religious activists sought to reverse their marginalisation. Beginning 
in 1952, they set aside the technical niceties of constitutional drafting and sought to 
define the boundaries of the Muslim community on the streets. Rejecting the 
marginalisation of their distinctive theological perspective, for instance, they attacked 
Pakistan’s heterodox Ahmadi community as “apostates” in a series of urban riots 
seeking to shore up their own position in defining the parameters of the nation. In 
doing so, however, they were seen by state officials as vigilantes rebelling against 
state authority.  
As rioters, they were demonized by the courts. And, in one rather prominent 
case (namely, that of Syed Abul ala Maududi), they were tried and jailed for 
“treason.” During the 1950s, in fact, the courts followed Hirschl in prioritising the 
fundamental rights of the Ahmadis against a coalition of religious activists who 
believed that constitutional references to “the sovereignty of God” meant that the 
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boundaries of the nation should be subject to their own expertise in defining “the 
limits prescribed by [Allah]” (Muhammad & Kayani, 1954). 
This pattern of polarization between Pakistani clerics (stressing the ulema’s 
privileged position in defining “the limits prescribed by [Allah]”) and local Ahmadis 
(stressing the primacy of each citizen’s fundamental rights) was further reinforced 
during the late 1960s in a case known as Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri v. West 
Pakistan (1969). In this case, the courts declared that the government was permitted 
to close down an anti-Ahmadi publication owing to a constitutional article stating that 
religious liberties were protected “subject to public order.” In effect, the court held 
that, in describing the Ahmadis as apostates, the publication in question encouraged 
vigilante action. The court simply used the language of “public order” to reinforce the 
line protecting Ahmadis from any limits unilaterally imposed by conservative Muslims.  
After 1973, however, Pakistan’s constitution was rewritten. The drafting 
process retained most of the existing language regarding the sovereignty of God, the 
role of the state and its elected representatives, the delineation of fundamental rights, 
and “the limits prescribed by [Allah]”. But, just 1 year after Pakistan's new 
constitution was unveiled, religious conservatives proposed a specific constitutional 
amendment prohibiting the country’s Ahmadis from being legally recognised as 
“Muslims.” 
Initially, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was reluctant to table this 
exclusionary amendment. But, when the same religious leaders threatened mass 
protests—partly owing to their lack of power in the Constituent Assembly after an 
unprecedented but still relatively poor showing in the 1970 elections (winning just 18 
out of 138 seats in West Pakistan)—Bhutto reconsidered. After a string of skirmishes 
following what was known as “The Rabwah Incident,” Bhutto formed a special 
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parliamentary committee (including a disproportionate number of clerics) to examine 
the legal status of the Ahmadis. “In making this decision,” writes Ali Usman Qasmi 
(2014), Bhutto hoped that “parliamentary procedures would slow down the course of 
the agitations” (p. 177).  
The constitutional amendment crafted by this special parliamentary committee 
enjoyed considerable popular support; in fact, it received the unanimous support of 
the legislature in September 1974. In effect, clerical voices seized the moment to 
reverse a long-standing pattern of legal marginalisation—not only during Pakistan’s 
early constitutional debates but also in a series of decisions issued by the superior 
courts. Combining active participation in a small parliamentary committee with 
threats of mass mobilization, they intervened to reshape the constitution itself.  
Pakistan’s second constitutional amendment (withdrawing state recognition of 
the Ahmadis as “Muslims”) was challenged just a few years later as a violation of the 
Ahmadis’ basic rights. However, in the case that followed (Abdur Rahman Mobashir 
v. Amir Ali Shah, 1978), Pakistan’s conservative religious forces were frustrated once 
again. Rearticulating its earlier position, the Supreme Court held that, although the 
Ahmadis’ religious identity had been legally redefined (meaning that, constitutionally, 
they were no longer seen by the state as “Muslims”), their remaining constitutional 
rights were still in place (Saeed, 2011). In effect, the court held that peaceful religious 
practices, including Ahmadi practices, were constitutionally protected from state 
interference because they did not interfere with the religious practices of others.  
This case (Mobashir) quickly generated a political response of its own. In 
particular, it prompted yet another group of religious conservatives to threaten mass 
protests if their demands for constraints on peaceful Ahmadi practices were not met. 
These threats of mass mobilization and protest dovetailed with the populist 
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Islamization agenda initiated by Prime Minister Bhutto and then expanded by his 
military successor, General Zia-ul-Haq, prompting specific amendments in the 
Pakistan Penal Code between 1984 and 1986. Above all, these amendments noted that 
any Ahmadi who referenced “Muslim” terms and practices—for example, describing 
his or her place of worship as a masjid (mosque)—was guilty of causing grave 
religious offense and, thus, at least potentially, disturbing public order. In fact this 
new round of legal reforms growing out of protests inspired by Mobashir turned the 
formal legal tables upside down. It was no longer religious vigilantes who were seen 
by the law as disturbing public order; it was, rather, the Ahmadis themselves who 
were seen as disturbing public order as heretical or blasphemous provocateurs. In   
the wake of Mobashir and the protests it engendered, Zia’s amendments in the 
Pakistan Penal Code gave the intimidating practices associated with moral vigilantism 
a certain measure of formal legal cover. 
The constitutionality of these new alterations in the Pakistan Penal Code was 
challenged, first in the Federal Shariat Court (Mujibur Rehman v. Federal 
Government, 1985) and then in Pakistan’s Supreme Court (Zaheeruddin v. the State, 
1993). But, this time, the court revised its approach. This time the court held that the 
legislature’s promulgation of regulatory measures (stipulating the boundaries of 
peaceful religious practice) was unfettered. In effect, hewing closely to a pattern of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence privileging the power of parliament-as-a-whole in 
matters of religion (Nelson, 2015)—a point that also figured prominently in the 
debates that led to Pakistan’s second constitutional amendment—the Court did not 
intervene to reduce existing levels of legal uncertainty regarding the protection of 
fundamental rights; it actually introduced a measure of uncertainty by highlighting the 
power of each elected legislature to “regulate” such rights and, therein, to determine 
 25 
which types of peaceful religious practice, under which conditions, might be seen as a 
“threat to public order” deserving, not protection, but prohibition. 
In Pakistan, the formal legal treatment of those using street power to exclude 
ostensibly heretical citizens changed over time. Initially, they were prosecuted as 
vigilantes; but, later on, their actions were protected as a response to religious 
provocation. Instead of functioning as a check on religious strife, court-based 
references to “public order” became an instrument through which the perpetrators of 
street-level violence got their exclusionary objectives legally authorized by the state. 
In effect, legal imperatives to protect public order were used to entrench and deepen 
divisions between mainstream Muslims and Ahmadis—divisions that intensified over 
time. Before 1986, religious vigilantes were prosecuted as a threat to public order. 
But, thereafter, violent forms of public protest have emerged as a tried-and-tested 
means for restricting the boundaries of Pakistan’s Muslim community within the 
terms of the law.  
 
Conclusion 
 In these vignettes from Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan, we provide 
an alternative account of the link between legal processes and religious tensions, one 
that considers closely the roles played by constitutional law and legal procedure in 
perpetuating and deepening conflict. While legal institutions did not create these 
conflicts from scratch or act alone in aggravating them, they did play a role in 
sustaining and/or sharpening these conflicts.  These four cases show how law can 
work in tandem with political and social forces to amplify, deepen, naturalize, 
entrench, or further polarize already existing religious tensions.  More precisely, these 
cases call attention to four distinct ways in which law and legal procedures can and do 
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increase polarization among groups in South and Southeast Asia: via the procedural 
requirements of litigation, via the strategic use of legal language and court judgments 
by socioreligious groups, via the popular representation of court decisions by activists 
and media; and via the exploitation of “public order” laws in contexts framed by 
antagonism targeting religious minorities. Moreover, a more extended analysis would 
likely reveal that multiple modes of polarization were at play in each of the four 
cases.  
Among other things, these examples stand as counternarratives to the more 
standard accounts of conversion in Sri Lanka, Hindutva in India, religious politics in 
Malaysia, or Ahmadi exclusion in Pakistan. In these standard accounts, law’s role is 
interpreted in the idiom of failure: in Sri Lanka, courts failed to definitively resolve 
grassroots disputes over conversion; in India, majoritarian bias crept into and 
subverted constitutional jurisprudence; in Malaysia, poorly conceived legal principles 
heaped impossible burdens on non-Muslims; in Pakistan, courts and constitutions 
failed to advance ideals of liberal inclusiveness. In these standard narratives, 
polarization, conflict, and violence are thought to result not from law’s influence, but 
from an absence of law’s influence.  
In each of these cases, one could place the blame with legal draftspersons, 
constituent assemblies, or higher court judges. One could argue that had elites in Sri 
Lanka, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan created more sensible laws and legal institutions 
or exercised more independence in higher court judgments, legal procedures might 
have successfully resolved rather than augmented the tensions in question. Indeed, 
this has been an influential way of analysing the cases described above. However, by 
jumping to conclusions about the would-be effectiveness of a more perfectly designed 
law (to read these histories as narratives about “bad law” or “botched law”), one 
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prematurely exculpates law; it ignores the roles that the real-world legal institutions 
and mechanisms do play in deepening religious strife. That is, to read these accounts 
as stories of (ideal) law’s absence rather than as stories of (actual) law’s presence, is 
to approach social, legal, and political history in a millenarian mode: waiting for the 
saving power of a perfect law to set things right. The majoritarian slant of Indian 
courts or the trumping power of state-based declarations regarding “public order” in 
Pakistan’s courts may well be deviations from an ideal designed in the philosophical 
“clean room” of philosophical liberalism, but they are certainly not aberrations as the 
law is lived and practiced in South and Southeast Asia.  
In offering these revaluations and alternative narrations, we strive to normalize 
law’s role in sustaining, reshaping, and advancing social strife by shining a light on 
some of the polarizing mechanisms of law. As seen in Sri Lanka, the protocols of 
litigation may render more binary and rigid what are often more fluid and flexible 
religious communities and boundaries. As seen in India, the language and opinions of 
court decisions cannot be fixed within a liberal politics; they may also be used as 
political slogans to justify exclusionary politics. As seen in Malaysia, court cases may 
serve as focal points for political activists to advance starkly different notions of 
rights, such that judicial decisions undergo significant discursive polarization in “the 
court of public opinion.” And, as seen in Pakistan, the powers of apex courts to 
authorize or deauthorize particular notions of public order may merge with street-
level politics to validate highly polarizing claims about the boundaries of the Muslim 
community. Indeed, the law’s attempted monopolization of religious boundary 
making in the wake of the 1973 Constitution may have done more to foster religious 
conflicts than a less centralized and rigid approach. 
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To see law’s polarizing potential is not to dismiss law out-of-hand or to call 
for scholars to abandon the dominant form of institutional organization and dispute 
resolution in most parts of the world. It is also not to claim that law polarizes (or 
polarizes equally) in all places and times. We have tried to specify particular 
situations under which polarization took place and, then, to account for particular 
features and circumstances that made those polarizing effects more problematic or 
pronounced. In pointing to these dynamics, we hope to encourage scholars and 
policy-makers to take seriously both the benefits and the unintended consequences of 
judicializing disputes over religion, and in doing so to introduce a new spirit of 
creativity, modesty, and humility about the ameliorative powers of law. This may lead 
us back to a reaffirmation of liberal constitutionalism—“a second naïveté,” as Paul 
Ricouer would have it—but from a place of scrupulous pragmatism and clear-eyed 
realism about both the losses and the gains associated with the rule of law. 
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1 This short quote does not, of course, capture the full sophistication and complexity of Bielefeldt’s 
thinking on the matter, only his general attitudes towards the beneficial potentials of law. In his broader 
address, for example, Bielefeldt explains that religious tensions should not be understood simply as 
“natural phenomenon,” but rather as the product of identity politics and other political dynamics. 
Accordingly, in this framing of things, the ameliorative effects of courts stem in large part from their 
rising above politics, rather than being enmeshed in politics.  
2 Advocates of a strong version of liberalism that favors individual rights over group rights might point 
out that separate personal law regimes exist for different religious communities in all four of the 
jurisdictions that we discuss. They might, therefore, point to the prevalence of group rights as the 
source of polarization. While personal law systems play some role in some of the cases, the 
mechanisms and dynamics that we describe are not peculiar to or derivative from jurisdictions that 
protect group rights. Rather these dynamics may equally be seen in places without such protections. 
For example, one can see similar dynamics at play in the context of the United States (Sullivan, 2005). 
3 For more detailed analysis of these dynamics in the Sri Lankan case, see Schonthal (2014). 
4 This bill was never taken up by parliament. 
5 Interview with leader in Methodist church, May 6, 2009. 
6 Article 121(1) of Sri Lanka’s constitution permits any citizen or group (provided three-fourths of the 
group’s registered members are Sri Lankan citizens) to challenge the constitutionality of a bill before 
the Supreme Court within a week of the bill being placed on the Order Paper of Parliament. 
7 Interview with member of committee, May 17, 2009. 
8 See Moustafa (2014). 
9 Hindu Right is the term used to characterize the Hindu social, religious, and political organizations 
that cluster under the umbrella of Sangh Parivar. The Bharatiya Janata Party is part of this group. 
10 The Orissa High Court found oppositely to the Madhya Pradesh High Court. In Orissa, the court held 
the Act ultra vires partly finding with  the party  who  opposed the act, on the grounds that the 
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definition of “inducement” was indeed too vague and, as such, would prohibit too many proselytizing 
activities. 
11 Previous anti-conversion bills in parliament, that were proposed and withdrawn, include the Indian 
Converts Regulation and Registration Bill (1955) and a similar Bill in 1960. 
12 The Pakistan case (below) describes another case of influential public protest. In India, Christian 
protestors sought to expand the space for conversion-focused activities and, thus, shifting religious 
identities; however, in Pakistan, protestors sought to restrict the scope for movement away from state-
recognised forms of Islam. 
13 Other judgments have exacerbated religious tensions. A judgment in the Shah Bano case, which 
involved a Muslim woman’s claim to maintenance from her divorced husband, was upheld over the 
objection that to do so would undermine Muslim personal law. This important decision precipitated a 
series of political actions – including the Government’s support of legislation to undo the decision.  
The case became a rallying cry for many, who 7 years later participated in the destruction of the Babri 
Masjid mosque in the city of Ayodhya. The Chief Justice’s remarks about Islam in that judgment 
triggered a cry that the judges were Islamophobic.  Cossman and Kapur (1996, 2001) argue that the 
court did not stop to consider that this uniform “way of life” is one based on assimilating religious and 
cultural minorities and on reconstituting all Indian citizens in the image of the unstated dominant norm, 
that is, a Hindu norm. See also Nussbaum(1999). 
14 Research on judicial behaviour in 190 anti-terror cases indicates that on the contrary, judges are more 
likely to rule in favour of Muslim (and Sikh) minorities as long as they do not harbour secessionist 
impulses (Shankar, 2009) .  
15 I used an online legal database, Manupatra, to find the cases on religious conversion in the high 
courts and the Supreme Court from 1950-2006, using a keyword search. Manupatra is a database used 
by the high court and Supreme court libraries and registrars. Manupatra typically captures 80-90% of 
the cases reported in the Supreme Court Recorder. I then used an excel sheet to code the cases 
according to characteristics such as the type of case, ruling, type of conversion, religious groups 
involved, SC litigant and others, and used the Stata program to run the regression models. Results are 
available with the author. 
16 The state is aware of the imbalance. Under V.P. Singh’s government (1989-90), the law was amended 
to extend affirmative action benefits to Hindu SCs converting to Buddhism, but SC Christians and 
Muslims still remained outside the fold (unless they were included as part of the backward classes in a 
state). The courts too have issued several judgments that treat affirmative action benefits as accruing to 
a backward class, rather than a caste. See, for instance, Moazzam Ali, Pradhan v. State of U.P., Writ 
Petition No. 6152 of 2001, Allahabad High Court. 
17 M.S. Golwalkar quoted in Talreja (1996). The Hindu nationalists have a long association with the 
issue of religious conversion. As Cassie Adcock (2013) points out, they were among the Indian elites 
who in the 1920s changed the meaning of shuddi, a lower caste “ritual-political” struggle for dignity 
with the upper castes, into the language of religious freedom and whether it should protect 
proselytizing, or whether proselytizing would be an intolerable threat to peaceable relations between 
(Hindu and Muslim) religious groups. This meaning continues to pervade the discourse on religious 
conversion. 
18 See Shankar, S. “Secularity and Hinduism’s Imaginaries in India” in M. Kunkler, J. Madeley & S. 
Shankar (Eds.), A Secular Age Beyond the North Atlantic (under review, Cambridge University Press). 
19 See the contrasting judgments of Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 SC 1918 and Manohar Joshi v. 
Nitin Bhaurau Patil, 1996, 1 SCC.  
20 Interview with S. Gurumurthy, an ideologue of the RSS and a co-convenor of the Swadeshi Jagran 
Manch, an organization for promoting the awareness of Indian tradition (March 6, 2007, Chennai, 
India).   
21 As previously noted, an expansive argument concerning the interface of constitutionalism and 
increased religiosity worldwide is Hirschl (2010). For an example of this framing in relation to 
Malaysia specifically, see Liow (2009). 
22 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain lain [2007] 4 M.L.J. 585, Lina Joy v. 
Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119.  
23 Article 11 Coalition, http://www.article11.org/ (last visited March 2, 2010). The website has since 
been closed. 
24 Press Release, PEMBELA, “Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pembela Islam Desak Masalah Murtad 
Ditangani Secara Serius” (Defenders of Islam Urge More Seriousness in Handling the Apostasy 
Problem; July 17, 2006; on file with the authors). 
25 For a more detailed examination of these mobilization dynamics, see Moustafa (2013). 
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26 For contextual details on how and why these cases became the sudden focus of media attention and 
civil society mobilization, see Moustafa (2013). Briefly, they are (a) a swiftly changing media 
environment with the rapid proliferation of digital media outlets; (b) the increased capacity and 
boldness of civil society organizations in the “reformasi” era; (c) the eruption in 2001 of an “Islamic 
state debate” between the ruling United Malays National Organisation and the opposition Islamist 
party, Parti Islam se-Malaysia; and (d) the strategic decision of liberal rights groups to “go public” 
about the difficulties that some non-Muslims were experiencing as a result of the contested jurisdiction 
of the shariah courts. 
27 A statutory declaration is the equivalent of an affidavit. A deed poll is a legal statement to express an 
intention.  
28 Attorneys recounted that shariah court judges had regularly facilitated the official recognition of 
conversion out of Islam when they were called on. Interviews with Latheefa Koya and Fadiah Nadwa 
Fikri, attorneys in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (June 29, 2009).  
29 Similar patterns are highlighted by Andreas Wimmer, Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, 
Networks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
30 In Pakistan, questions about religious freedom and the Ahmadis involve several constitutional 
provisions. These include provisions regarding (a) freedom of religious belief and practice (“subject to 
public order”); (b) a prohibition on legislation considered “repugnant to Islam”; (c) “the legislative 
primacy of parliament” (in light of “advice” from a special council charged with assessing matters of 
repugnancy); (c) the formation of a Federal Shariat Court (1980) to determine whether laws are 
“repugnant to Islam”; and (e) ongoing debates about the extent to which, via constitutional 
amendments or routine legislation, parliament or the executive can make laws (including emergency 
laws) that do not merely regulate but substantively annihilate fundamental religious rights. See Nelson 
(2015). 
 
